{
  "pillars": [
    {
      "id": "defense",
      "name": "Defense",
      "scores": [
        46.60885723134098,
        93.55123419278294,
        80.82101497034178
      ],
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Equipment sourced from EU suppliers",
          "year": "EU · major order sample since February 2022",
          "values": [
            "46.6%",
            "—",
            "—"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "External arms exports",
          "year": "US & China · 2021–25 · million SIPRI volume units",
          "values": [
            "—",
            "64,657",
            "8,584"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "External arms imports",
          "year": "US & China · 2021–25 · million SIPRI volume units",
          "values": [
            "—",
            "4,457",
            "2,037"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "EU = share of major equipment orders won by EU suppliers. US and China = 100 × arms exports ÷ (exports + imports).",
      "limit": "Europe tracks the origin of equipment purchases. US and China use arms-trade balance as a proxy for industrial strength. These are different measures; large exports alone cannot establish self-sufficiency or readiness.",
      "notes": "The sourcing figure covers eight equipment categories. US and Chinese transfers include aid and second-hand weapons. SIPRI volume units are separate from prices and expenditure.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "SIPRI · arms transfers 2025",
          "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf"
        },
        {
          "label": "SIPRI · definitions",
          "url": "https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / SIPRI · imports",
          "url": "https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.MPRT.KD"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / SIPRI · exports",
          "url": "https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPRT.KD"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU procurement and sourcing · main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#defense"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "energy",
      "name": "Energy",
      "scores": [
        42.7,
        100,
        76.65
      ],
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Net energy imports",
          "year": "EU 2024 · US & China 2023",
          "values": [
            "57.3%",
            "−8.70%",
            "23.35%"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Score = 100 minus net energy imports, limited to 0–100.",
      "limit": "Years and accounting differ. Europe uses newer Eurostat figures. The US and China use older World Bank/IEA data.",
      "notes": "EU net imports use gross available energy; US and Chinese international-series definitions differ. Net exporters receive 100 import-independence points. Fuel and supplier concentration remain gaps.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "World Bank / IEA · net energy imports",
          "url": "https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/EUU;USA;CHN/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS?date=2023&format=json"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU energy figures · main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#energy"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "technology",
      "name": "Technology",
      "scores": [
        18.5,
        64.82494516472569,
        76.49342614529205
      ],
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Chip demand supplied by EU production",
          "year": "EU · 2024",
          "values": [
            "22%",
            "—",
            "—"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "European cloud-provider revenue share",
          "year": "Wider Europe · 2025 estimate",
          "values": [
            "15%",
            "—",
            "—"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Global chip-making capacity",
          "year": "US & China · 2024",
          "values": [
            "—",
            "9.9%",
            "25.3%"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Chip exports",
          "year": "2024 · integrated circuits, HS 8542 · USD",
          "values": [
            "—",
            "$51.2bn",
            "$161.6bn"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Chip imports",
          "year": "2024 · integrated circuits, HS 8542 · USD",
          "values": [
            "—",
            "$41.3bn",
            "$386.5bn"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Domestic cloud providers among six leaders",
          "year": "US & China · Q2 2024",
          "values": [
            "—",
            "6 of 6",
            "6 of 6"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "EU = average of chip supply (share of demand met by EU production) and European cloud share. US and China = equal thirds: chip-making capacity (scored against 25.3%), chip trade (exports ÷ (exports + imports) × 100) and domestic cloud providers among six leaders (× 100 ÷ 6).",
      "limit": "Trade adds a view of import dependence, but imported chips can go into exported electronics. Factory capacity misses chip sophistication; cloud rankings miss market share. EU uses different measures, so this remains a rough comparison.",
      "notes": "US = average of capacity 39.1304348, chip trade 55.3444007 and cloud 100 = 64.8249452. China = average of capacity 100, chip trade 29.4802784 and cloud 100 = 76.4934261. Capacity uses 2024 wafer starts irrespective of factory ownership or chip sophistication; 25.3% is the largest share among EU, US and China. Trade uses reported 2024 gross flows for HS 8542 from UN Comtrade via World Bank WITS. In USD thousands: US exports 51,242,866.01 and imports 41,346,204.16; China exports 161,590,484.83 and imports 386,540,311.09. Balanced trade earns 50 trade points; this is not the share of demand supplied domestically. Re-exports, reimports and repeated border crossings are included. Chips embedded in finished electronics, chip-making equipment and offshore design income are not captured by HS 8542. Cloud counts domestic headquarters among six leaders, with equal weight per firm. Chip-company revenue is excluded for US/China. EU = average of domestic chip supply (22) and European cloud share (15) = 18.5; its cloud market includes the UK.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "IDC / Commission · chip-making capacity",
          "url": "https://zenodo.org/records/21931219"
        },
        {
          "label": "Commission · cloud providers, table 1",
          "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026SC0502"
        },
        {
          "label": "Synergy · cloud markets",
          "url": "https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/cloud-is-a-global-market-apart-from-china"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU Technology calculation · main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#technology"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade · US chip exports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/USA/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade · US chip imports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/USA/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade · China chip exports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/CHN/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade · China chip imports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/CHN/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "economy",
      "name": "Economy",
      "scores": [
        65.17155944292747,
        58.681675971984234,
        78.81720843950293
      ],
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Chip supply-chain vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 · lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.22",
            "0.20",
            "0.18"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Clean-tech vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 · lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.18",
            "0.28",
            "0.10"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Raw-material vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 · lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.28",
            "0.31",
            "0.24"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "For each supply chain: points = min(100, 100 × −log₁₀(vulnerability)). Average the three point scores. All three economies are scored this way.",
      "limit": "The 0.10 reference is our trial scoring choice, not an official target. Logs reward proportional reductions in vulnerability and allow strong areas to offset weak ones.",
      "notes": "For each 2023 vulnerability reading v, calculate 100 × −log10(v), cap at 100, then average the three scores. The 0.10 reference is a scoring convention, not an official target. EXVI is an index, not a probability of disruption. Strength in one supply chain can offset weakness in another. Finance and services are outside coverage.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "Commission · External Vulnerability Index comparison",
          "url": "https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/475d6e99-55ba-41bf-920d-1da2b44fdeb3/download"
        },
        {
          "label": "Authors · index methodology",
          "url": "https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/external-vulnerability-index-a-tool-to-assess-trade-weaknesses.html"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU Economy calculation · main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#economy"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "information",
      "name": "Information",
      "scores": [
        51.01302793,
        88.07094907135185,
        null
      ],
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Cinema & TV",
          "year": "EU · three viewing channels / US · cinema only",
          "values": [
            "28.7",
            "95.5 ≈",
            "—"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Music",
          "year": "2025 · national year-end top ten charts",
          "values": [
            "58.7",
            "90.0",
            "—"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "News",
          "year": "2026 · leading brands and ownership",
          "values": [
            "77.8",
            "75.0",
            "—"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Social media for news",
          "year": "2025 · creator base and platform ownership",
          "values": [
            "38.9",
            "91.8 ≈",
            "—"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Four areas, each worth 25%. US = average of 95.5, 90.0, 75.0 and 91.8, calculated before rounding. EU follows the main dashboard.",
      "limit": "The broader US score is provisional. Its screen measure covers cinema only, while Europe includes broadcast and streaming. Social-platform surveys ask different questions. These gaps matter when comparing the totals.",
      "notes": "Cinema: EU averages cinema admissions, broadcast film minutes and streaming viewing. US uses 2023 domestic film share of box-office revenue as its screen proxy. Music: nine of the 2025 US top-ten tracks feature wholly US artists. The mixed Korean/US collaboration APT earns zero domestic points in this conservative version. News: offline domestic leading-brand reach is 62/85 and online 47/61, averaged equally. Generic local-TV entries are unresolved. Social: 14 of 15 nominated creators have US professional bases. US-controlled platforms account for 111 of 123 summed news-use responses across six services. TikTok is coded by its 2025 ownership. Europe uses a separate Eurobarometer platform-importance question covering 12 services. All categories measure selected uses or chart slots; audiences can overlap. Reuters covers the US, Hong Kong and Taiwan, with no mainland China survey.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "Commission · EU cinema share, page 54",
          "url": "https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12608-2025-INIT/en/pdf#page=54"
        },
        {
          "label": "European Audiovisual Observatory · US, page 44",
          "url": "https://rm.coe.int/focus2024/1680b5a5bf#page=44"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters · 2026 market coverage",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters · US 2026",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026/united-states"
        },
        {
          "label": "US offline brand reach",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uqnEW/2/"
        },
        {
          "label": "US online brand reach",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/xLiBC/2/"
        },
        {
          "label": "Billboard · US year-end Hot 100, 2025",
          "url": "https://www.billboard-japan.com/charts/detail?a=uhot100_year&year=2025"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters · US creators, 2025",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news-creators-influencers/2025/United-States"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters · 15 nominated US creators",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ZREMa/5/"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters · US platform news use, 2025",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0GgM6/1/"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU four-part Information method",
          "url": "index.html#information"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "date": "2026-11-10",
  "overall_method": "EU and US: equal-weight average of five pillars (20% each). China: equal-weight average of four pillars (25% each), excluding Information. Totals differ in coverage. EU uses the main dashboard methodology; US and China use alternative proxies where evidence differs.",
  "totals": {
    "EU": 48.16720498577978,
    "US": 73.6139961742866,
    "China": 72.997052705397
  }
}